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Resumen
Este artículo examina los problemas de agencia que surgen cuando los bancos centrales rescatan a
los bancos con problemas financieros. Específicamente, los objetivos de este artículo son: (i)
determinar los problemas de agencia que surgen cuando los bancos centrales compran la cartera
riesgosa de los bancos con problemas financieros y;  ii) estudiar la respuesta de los bancos
rescatados frente a los nuevos incentivos que enfrentan. La evidencia empírica de la crisis bancaria
chilena de los ochenta muestra que los bancos recatados tuvieron más altos niveles de riego y
fueron menos eficientes. Sin embargo, no es claro que los niveles de riesgo más altos se debieron a
problemas de riesgo moral. También encontramos que algunas medidas adicionales implementadas
por el banco central ayudaron a minimizar los problemas de agencia. Entre estas medidas se
encuentran los límites impuestos a la ayuda financiera por banco, la venta o cierre de los bancos con
problemas financieros más serios y, la designación de administradores provisionales impuestos por
el gobierno en algunos bancos.
Abstract
This paper examines the agency problems that arise when a Central Bank rescues a failing bank.
Specifically, the objectives of this paper are to determine:  (1) the agency problems that derive from
the mechanism of the purchase of risky loans and (2) the response of the banks to the incentives that
they face when the Central Bank purchased their risky loans. The empirical evidence from the
Chilean banking crisis of the 1980s shows that the rescued banks had higher levels of risk and they
were less efficient. However, it is not clear that the higher level of risks were due to moral hazard
behavior. I also found that some additional measures mitigated the agency problems. These
mitigating factors included limiting the amount of financial assistance per bank, the closing or
selling of the banks with more serious solvency problems and, the designation of Provisional
Administrator in some banks.
____________________
The author is thankful for the valuable discussion with and comments from  Alito Harberger, Eduardo
Schwartz, Federico Sturzenneger and Carlos Végh. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not
those of the Central Bank of Chile.
E-mail: gsanhueza@zahleryco.cl.1
1.  Introduction
The way in which a financial crisis is handled could generate several agency
problems.  A common response to a financial crisis is for the government to provide
financial assistance, purchase the risky loans portfolio, or change the regulations to keep
the banks afloat.  However, if these solutions are improperly implemented, the banks
could be left with an incentive to engage in “gambling for resurrection” or “looting the
bank” behavior.  The US Saving & Loan crisis is an example of a case in which such
problems arose.
1 The main regulatory responses to the S&Ls’ problems was deregulated
the industry to allow S&Ls to diversify their activities, the government lent money to
troubles institutions and capital adequacy ratios were reduced. Although, a significant
amount of S&Ls recovery from its solvency problems, the institutions deeply insolvent
experienced rapid growth and diversify to riskier assets, becoming more insolvent at the
end of the 80s.
The solutions to the Chilean banking crises of the 1980s provide the opportunity
to study the agency problems that arose when the government rescues a failing bank, as
well as the response of the banks to the incentives that they face.  In the Chilean case, the
Central Bank purchased the risky portfolio of the banks, with the commitment that the
banks had to buy back these same portfolios as future profits appeared.
The first objective of this paper is to determine the agency problems that arise
when the mechanism of acquiring risky loans is implemented to solve banking crisis.
The second objective is to study the response of the banks to the incentives to increase
their risk and operating expenses that they face and to estimate how significant these2
agency problems were during the period of study.  Our analysis is based on the moral
hazard problem that derives from the relation between bondholders and equity holders, as
well as the relationship between outside equity holders and managers, based on the
theories of Jensen and Meckling (1976). In the empirical part of the research, I worked
with information on all Chilean banks for the period of 1986-1998.
  This paper contributes to the literature on moral hazard and banking crises by
analyzing empirically the responses of the Chilean banks to the agency problem.  Salanié
(1999) states that there is a lack of empirical research on moral hazard due to the lack of
information.  Thus, this paper helps to fill the gap.  In particular, the Chilean banking
crisis is an interesting case because one can inquire into agency problems, and moral
hazard as well as the behavior of different individual banks and classes of banks.
In the case of the solutions to the Chilean banking crises of 1980s, there were two
channels through which agency problems, specifically moral hazard, arose.
 2  First, there
was the standard problem that the equity holders could exploit debt-holders, making use
of their limited liability. If a bank increase its risk level, there is a probability of higher
return that benefit the equity holders. However, there is also a higher probability of lower
return that negative affect the debt-holder. The second problem was that there was a
divergence of interests between the commercial bank managers and the Central Bank.
This divergence was due to the fact that the bank managers did not bear the costs of any
non-pecuniary benefit (e.g., size and location of the office, secretarial staff, charitable
contributions, personal relationship with employees) that operated to increase their own
                                                                                                                                                                            
1 See Dewatripont and Tirole for a summary of the US S&L crisis, also White (1991) and Akerloff and
Romer (1993).
2 According to Selanié (1999) there are three elements that define a moral hazard problem: i) the Agent
takes a decision that affects his utility and that of the Principal; (ii) the Principal only observes the outcome,
an imperfect signal of the action taken; and iii) the action the Agent would choose spontaneously is not3
utility.  So, the banks managers had an incentive to increase some expenses that enhanced
their own utility but not the profit of the banks. This problem is similar to the outside
equity agency problem outlined by Jensen and  Meckling (1976), where there was a
similar conflict between the manager shareholder and the rest of the shareholders. The
Central Bank problem was worse because the Central Bank did not have voting rights and
could not remove the managers.
According to the distinction made by Akerloff and Romer (1993), one can classify
the incentive to exploit the Central Bank by increasing the risk of the bank as “gambling
for resurrection.”  And, one can classify the incentive to increase the expenditure as
“looting.”  The difference is that looting is a deliberate plunge into negative net worth,
while gambling for resurrection is intended to give the bank an opportunity to get back to
a position of positive net worth.
In the estimations, I developed indicators of moral hazard behavior, such as risk
level and cost efficiency for each bank, and then applied non-parametric and parametric
procedures to test the different behaviors of the banks with subordinated debt and the
banks without subordinated debt.  To develop cost efficiency indicators, I applied panel
data procedures to estimate a translog cost function.
The main results of the paper indicate that, when the Central Bank purchases bad
loans to handle bank failure, there is a potential risk of moral hazard behavior on the part
of the rescued bank, increasing its risk to maximize the value of the equities and
increasing operating cost to increase the managers utility.  The empirical evidence from
the Chilean banking crisis of the 1980s shows that the rescued banks had higher levels of
                                                                                                                                                                            
Pareto-optimal.4
risk and they were less efficient.  However, it is not clear that the higher level of risk was
due to an agency problem or to moral hazard behavior.
Additionally, in reviewing the Chilean cases, I found that there were some
measures that the Central Bank and the  Superintendency of Banks were able to
implement to reduce the agency problems. These measures  included: (a) limiting the
amount of financial assistance per bank; (b) closing or selling those banks with more
serious solvency problems and; (c) changing the management of some banks.
It is interesting to note that, beyond the potential moral hazard problem, new
financial problems appeared in only one of the banks that were rescued during the
Chilean financial crisis.  The Superintendency took full control of the Banco Nacional
and the owner had to sell the bank because he could not raise sufficient advanced capital
funds, in 1989.   This outcome can be considered successful when compared with the
results of the US Saving & Loans crisis where a significant amount of rescued bank at the
beginning of the 80s, fail again at the end of the 80s.
3
The paper is divided in an introduction (Section 1) and five remaining sections.
Section 2 examines the agency problems that involve purchases of risky loans and/or
artificial inflation of real costs.  Section 3 describes non-parametric and parametric
estimation procedures.  Section 4 presents and describes the data.  Section 5 presents the
results of our estimations.  Finally, Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
 2.  Agency Problems
One of the solutions to banking crises is for the Central Bank to purchase the risky
portfolio of the banks.  During the Chilean financial crisis of the 1980s, the Central Bank5
purchased the risky portfolio of the banks with the commitment from the banks that they
would have to buy back their risky portfolios with a proportion (70% or more) of their
future profit. It was only a proportion of the profit because the banks needed to raise new
capital, and the incentive to the shareholders to invest money lies in receiving dividends.
In the Chilean case, preferential shares were created.  These shares were issued when the
bank needed new capital.  The distinctive characteristic of the new shares was that they
had limited rights to dividends.  Thus, the banks that sold their risky portfolio to the
Central Bank had a subordinate debt with the Central Bank. These debts had to paid with
a proportion of future profits of the banks. 
4
This mechanism of solution leaves three types of agents sharing the profits of the
bank.  Figure 1 shows that the older owners of the bank continued owning a part of the
bank, but would not receive dividends until the bank had paid back all its subordinated
debt to the Central Bank.  These shareholders kept their voting rights and participated in
new capital issues that were not acquired with retained profits.
                                                                                                                                                                            
3 Barth et al. 1991, indicates that around 200 institutions were sold or liquidated in 1988.
4  Some of the measures applied in the US Saving & Loans rescue have the same results as did the
purchases of risky portfolio, in terms of keeping afloat an institution and allowing to it achieve a high level
of leverage. According to Dewatripont et al. 1994, some of the measures applied in the US Saving & Loans
rescue were:  (i) the government lent money to institutions that were unable to raise new capital; (ii) capital
adequacy ratios were reduced; and (iii) intervention rules for institutions that were undercapitalized were
weakened.6
Figure 1. Participation on the Profits of the Banks with Subordinated Debt.
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The second group of shareholders bought shares when the financial institutions
sought to raise new capital in the wake of the financial crisis.  Their shares have limited
dividend rights.  The “new” shareholders could receive only a fraction of the earnings of
theirs shares (the maximum was 30%) until the bank had paid back all its subordinated
debt.  They had voting rights and could participate in new capital issues.
The third agent is the Central Bank, which receives the dividend amount that
corresponds to the old owners of the bank and the proportion of earnings that was not
received by the new shareholders.  The Central Bank does not have voting rights and it is
not involved in the management of the bank.  However, it has to approve the conditions
under which each bank raises capital.
The agency problems or moral hazard problem arise because this way of splitting
the profit of the bank creates a non-linear relationship between the value of the bank and
the return for old and new shareholders.  Figure 2 shows that if the subordinated debt for7
a bank is an amount equal to K, and the proportion of profit that goes to pay the
subordinated debt is “a”, then when the value of the bank (V) is equal to K/a the
shareholders will have completely recovered their right to dividends. This is the point V0
in figure 2.  The old shareholders will receive a return equal to zero if the value of the
bank is less than V 0 and, from that point on, their return will be equal to their
proportionate  share of the bank’s earnings.  As such, the relationship between the value
of the bank and his return is non-linear and is given by the line obc.
The new shareholders have a return equal to their percentage share of the bank (q)
times bank earnings, times their fractional right to dividends (r), if the value of the bank
is less than V0.  After that, their investment increases in an amount equal to the increment
in the value of the bank (V-V0) times their share in the property equity (q). Without
applying the limiting fraction, r. The differential treatments with respect to r makes the
relationship between their return and the value of the bank is non-linear, as shown by the
line ode.8











To explain the moral hazard problem that arises with the subordinate debt, I use a
simple two-periods model.  At t=0, I have a bank with a loan portfolio of L, deposits of
B, a subordinate debt of K, and capital equal to E.  During the next period, the value of
the loan portfolio (L’) will reflect the return on its existing loans.  If the value of the loan
portfolio (L’) is lower than the value of the deposits (B), the value of the deposits will be
equal to the value of the loan portfolio (L’), and the value of the subordinated debt and
the equities will be equal to zero. If the value of the loan portfolio is higher than B but
less than B plus K, the value of the subordinated debt will be equal to L’ minus B, and
the value of the equities will be equal to zero. Finally, if the value of the loan portfolio
(B) is higher than B plus K, the value of the deposits will be equal to B, the value of the
subordinated debt will be K, and the value of the equities will be equal to the difference
between L’ minus B, minus K.  Thus, the firm’s equity value is equal to:
(1)          )] ( ' , 0 [ ' K B L Max E + - =9
It was shown by Black-Scholes (1973) that the firm’s equity value could be
regarded as a European call option.  The idea is that shareholders have an option to buy
back the firm from the bondholder for an exercise price equal to the face value of the
firm’s debt at time t = 1.  As such, applying the standard formula for the price of a call
option and working with one period, the value of equity capital at t=0 is equal to S:
(2)  ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 d N e K B d LN S
r + - =
Where: N(.) is the standardized normal cumulative probability density function; r is the
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A standard result is that the semi elasticity of the value of the equity capital, with
respect to the variance of the assets (s
2), is positive and its size depend on the ratio of
total debt to total assets, as in equation 3.  This implies that if the shareholder wants to
maximize the value of the firm’s equity, then within the class of projects with the same
net present value, banks will choose those with the higher risk.  In this way, the banks
increase the value of their equity, reducing the value of its debt.
5  Thus, I have a typical
moral hazard problem, according to the definition of Salanié (1999):  (a) the agent (the
bank) takes an action (risk) that affects its utility and that of the principal (Central Bank);
(b) the principal only observes the outcome, an imperfect signal of the action taken; and
(c) the action that agent would choose spontaneously is not Pareto-optimal.
                                                          
5 See Ingersoll (1987) for the derivation of these expressions. He has an illustrative example on p. 418.10
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Where z() is the normal standard density function at d2
Thus, it is clear that the banks with subordinated debt have an incentive to
increase their risk, and the incentive is proportional to its level of subordinated debt.  The
authority can reduce this problem by limiting its purchase of bad loans from the financial
institutions.  In fact, that was one of the measures implemented in the solutions of the
Chilean banking crisis.  The limit initially was 1.5 times the capital of each bank, later
this limit was augmented to 2.5 times and finally to 3.5 times capital.
However, the fact that a bank with subordinated debt shows a higher level of risk
does not necessarily mean that it is a result of moral hazard behavior.  An alternative
hypothesis is that the bank with subordinated debt started out, after the crisis, with the
worst indicators of risk. Additionally, if there is inertia, it would take a time to adjust to a
more reasonable level of risk.
The other problem that the mechanism of solution generated is that banks with a
high level of subordinated debt (which means that it takes a long time for the banks to
pay back their subordinated debt and for shareholders to recover their right to receive
dividends), and whose profit were mostly used to repurchase their subordinated debt,
have little incentive to show a profit.  This leads to shareholders having incentives to
mask any potential profit by using transfer prices (such as higher wages or better offices
or other amenities), thus increasing the operating costs of the bank instead of producing a
profit to pay the subordinated debt.  This problem is more serious in the cases in which
the owner manages the bank.  Thus, again I have the three elements of the moral hazard11
problem:  (a) the agent (the bank) takes an action (reducing cost efficiency) that affects
its utility and that of the principal (Central Bank); (b) the principal observes, just the
outcome, an imperfect signal of the action taken; and (c) the action that agent would
choose spontaneously is not Pareto-optimal.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) outline this problem in the context of the managers
and outside shareholders.  They compare the behavior of a manager, who is a 100%
owner of the firm, with his behavior when owning less than 100%.  The problem is that
there is a divergence of interest between the manager-shareholder and the outside
shareholders because the manager-shareholder bears only a part of the costs of any non-
pecuniary benefit (e.g., size and location of the office, secretarial staff, charitable
contributions, personal relationship with employees) that he or she takes out to maximize
his or her own utility.
However, the fact that a bank with subordinated debt has a higher level of cost
inefficiency than the other banks does not necessarily mean that it is involved in moral
hazard behavior. It is possible that, because of the crisis, the loan portfolio was reduced
and the bank had to adjust to a smaller scale.  If there is inertia to make the adjustment, as
a result of the crisis and/or if economies of scale are presents, the bank will became more
inefficient as a results of this adjustment.
The  Superintendency tried to reduce this agency problem by designating a
Provisional Administrator in the banks in greatest financial distress, during the period of
the crisis.
In the next section, I review the procedures for testing these hypotheses. The first
hypothesis is that other things being equal, the banks with subordinated debt incurred
greater risk in order to enhance the value of their equity. The second one is that the banks12
with subordinated debt were less cost efficient because the managers incurred greater
operating expenses in order to augment their own utility.
3.  Methods of Estimation
I applied non-parametric and parametric methods to test whether the rescued
banks ended up with higher levels of risk and cost inefficiency than banks without
subordinated debt, and to study how these factors are related to the phenomena of
subordinated debt.  The non-parametric test provides the degree of evidence for an
association between these variables.  However, the parametric method permits us to
explore the causality among variables and to make inferences about the significance of
the effects.
3a.  Non-Parametric Tests
Working with two-way contingency tables, I classified the banks according to
whether or not they have subordinated debt and whether their risk or efficiency levels are
high or low. I developed several indicators of risk and efficiency and classified a bank as
high risk if its risk indicator was above the median and low risk if it was below.  I did the
same with the efficiency indicators.  Thus, I ended with one contingency table for each
indicator.
Using these contingency tables, I tested the hypothesis that the different
classifications are independent.  Specifically, I was interested in testing whether the level
of a bank’s risk or efficiency is independent of its status with respect to subordinated
debt.  I used the Pearson chi-square to test the hypothesis of independence.
613
3b.  Parametric Techniques
I estimated a model for bank risk that combines time series data and cross-
sectional data.  The model states that a bank’s risk level (y) depends on its subordinated
debt (SD), an unobserved individual specific effect (v), and an random error (e).  Using
subscripts k for the bank and t for the year, the risk function for a given bank is specified
by the following equation:
(4)       kt k kt kt e v SD y + + + = b a
I have three proxies for the variable SD that measure the subordinate debt. First, I
used a dummy variable that distinguishes between a bank with subordinated debt and a
bank without subordinate debt.  This allowed me to measure the effects that are non-
linear.  Second, I used the amount of subordinate debt that each bank had as a proportion
of its capital.  Third, the share of the profit of the banks that was transferred to the Central
Bank.
This model allows me to control for individual effects specific to each bank, but
invariable through time.  If I do not control for these effects, the estimators would be
biased.
To identify unobserved individual effects (vk) from random error (e), I used the
error components procedure, in which the disturbances of the regression (ukt) take the
following form:
(5)      kt k kt e v u + =
                                                                                                                                                                            
6 See Agresti (1996 ) for two-way contingency table tests and procedures.14
There are different ways in which one could statistically manage unobserved
individual effects (v).  One is to assume that there is no heterogeneity, so each parameter
v is equal to zero.  A second possibility is to assume that the unobserved individual
effects are fixed parameters, different for each firm and can be estimated by introducing a
dummy variable for each firm.  This model is known as the fixed effects model (DVLS).
Once can interpret this model as being the same as equation 4, but with a different for
each bank, and with a random error equal to e.  An alternative is to assume that there are
no systemic differences among the firms and thus that  vk is zero. This model is known as
the random effects model.
It is not clear whether we should prefer the fixed or random effects model.  The
fixed effect model is reasonable if it is truthful that the model applies only to the cross-
sectional units in the study, not to additional ones outside.  An additional problem with
the fixed effects model is that the use of many dummy variables results in the loss of
degrees of freedom. This loss is avoided if the individual effects specific to each firm (v)
can be assumed to be random.  In the event, I estimated both variants, and applied the
standard test to determine (ex post) which model appears more appropriate. 
7
However, as I will show in the estimations, I have to introduce inertia in the
model, so the equation to estimate is equal to:
(6)    kt k kt kt kt e v SD y y + + + + = - b g a 1
                                                          
7 There are two tests to distinguish if there is heterogeneity in the sample across units and one test to
identify if this heterogeneity must be thought as fixed or as random effects. The first is an F-test to test for
the joint significance of the dummy variables associated with each bank. The second is a Lagrange
Multiplier test developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) to test if the variance of the individual effects is
equal to zero.  Finally, there is the Hausman´s test to determine if the random effects and the regressors are
orthogonal as it is assumed in the random effects model. If they are not independent then the parameters
will be bias in  the random effects model.15
When one has the lagged dependent variable as the explanatory variable, the
DVLS estimator becomes inconsistent.  To deal with this problem, I followed the
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) procedures, estimating the model in the first difference, to
eliminate the individual specific effect, and used instrumental variables.
8
For the study of the relationship between cost efficiency and subordinated debt, I
first estimated an indicator of the cost efficiency for each bank.  The literature about cost
efficiency distinguishes three types of efficiencies.  Scale efficiency refers to whether the
firm is operating at the most cost efficient scale. Depending on the cost function, there be
a range of output levels over which there are economies of scale, implying that there is an
least-cost optimum level or range of output. Thus, a bank which starts out operating in
the least-cost range, could end up increasing its average cost if events cause it to reduce
its scale.  The other two types of efficiency are known as X-efficiency. Technical
inefficiency refers to using too large a proportion of the inputs to produce a determined
quantity of output.  Allocative inefficiency refers to using the wrong combination of
inputs to produce a given level of output.  In figure 3, I have a typical isoquant.  If I am
producing  yo with the vector of inputs  x
a, the technical inefficiency is given by the
parameter p, because I can reduce the quantity of both inputs until px
a and produce the
same quantity yo.  However, I also can change the combination of inputs x1 and x2 until
point B and still produce yo but with an additional reduction in the cost.  This is the
allocative inefficiency given for the parameters q/p.
9
                                                          
8 See Hsiao (1986) to the analysis of dynamic models with variable intercepts.
9 Pesaran and Schmidt (1999), explains the econometric implications of the different types of inefficiencies.16













To measure the X-inefficiency, the standard procedure is to estimate a best
practice cost function, which is the predicted cost function of banks that are X-efficient,
and then measure the degree of inefficiency relative to this best practice technology. 
10
As I had time series data and cross-sectional data, I used a panel data technique to
develop our indicator of efficiency.
11
I estimated a cost function (C), in which the cost depends on the prices of the
variables inputs (w), the quantities of variable outputs (y), random error (e), and the
efficiency (u).  This cost function is given by the following equation:
(7)
                                                          
10 There are several techniques to estimate the best practice cost function, such as the data envelopment
approach, the fee disposable hull analysis, the stochastic frontier approach, the thick frontier approach, and
the distribution free approach. For a review of these procedures, see Mester (1996), Berger et al. (1997) and
Pesaran and Schmidt (1999).
11 See Lang and Wezel (1996) for an estimation of the efficiency cost using panel data and Pesaran (1999)
for the advantages of panel data estimation over other procedures.
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Assuming that the inefficiency and the random error are multiplicatively separable
from the rest of the cost function, and using a non-homothetic translog functional form,
the natural log of the cost function using subscript k for the bank and t for the time is the
following:
12
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This cost function is estimated following the same procedure as was used to
estimate the risk function, that is by using the component error regression model, as well
as the fixed and random effects model, to identify the individual effects.  These
individual effects are measures of differences in cost efficiency.  If I compare the cost
functions of two banks that have the same values for the exogenous variables on the right
side of equation 8, the cost function will be different just because the parameters uk will
be different.  The bank with a higher uk will show higher costs, so it will be less efficient.
Our indicator of cost efficiency is given the following equation:
(9)
                                                          
12 See Brown et al. (1979) for the advantages of the translog function. Berger and DeYoung (1996) and
Berger and  Mester (1997) have shown that there are small differences with other cost function














k is the indicator of cost efficiency for bank k, um is the minimum individual
effect, and uk is the individual specific effect of bank k.  This indicator is equal to one for
the best practice cost efficiency bank and a lower level indicates a less efficient bank.
This indicator of efficiency measures both technical and allocative efficiencies.
The indicator shows the proportion of resources that the bank is using efficiently. The
indicator does not measure the efficiencies of scale because I control for the output level
of each bank.
Once I had the indicator of cost efficiency for each bank, I tested whether the
banks with subordinated debt were less efficient than the banks without subordinated
debt. I split the banks between high efficiency (about in a efficiency scale the median)
and low efficiency (below the median). Then, using a two-way contingency table, I
classify the banks according to whether they do or do not have subordinated debt, and by
their levels of efficiency. Finally, a c
2 test is used to assess whether the two criteria are
independent.
Additionally, I ran a simple regression model in which the dependent variable was
the indicator of efficiency and the regressor was a proxy for the subordinated debt.  I used
my two proxies: (a) the level of subordinated debt of each bank as a proportion of its
capital; and (b) the proportion of each bank’s profit that went to the Central Bank as
payment of the subordinated debt.19
4.  Data
I worked with annual data from the publications of the Superintendency of the
Banks of Chile, covering all Chilean banks for the period of 1986-1998.  At the end of
1986, there were 40 banks in the Chilean financial system.  Of these, 19 had been rescued
from the financial crisis during the period of 1981-1985 and had subordinated debt with
the Central Bank.  Table 1 presents the evolution of the institutions that were rescued and
had subordinate debt.  Six paid their subordinate debt between 1986 and 1990 and
another two were merged with institutions that had subordinated debt at the time.
Between 1990 and 1995, another six institutions paid their subordinated debt with the
Central Bank.  Finally, under a new system of payment, four institutions were freed of
any further obligation, after making partial payments (of subordinated debt) to the
Central Bank during the period of 1996-1998.   Only one institution still has subordinated
debt.
In the non-parametric estimations, I included all the banks in the sample.  This
meant that if a bank closed its operations, I included its information until the last year that
it was in operation.  However, in the parametric estimation, I excluded those banks for
which I did not have complete information.
A summary of the information that I used is given in Table 2.  As one can see the
distribution functions of the data are not symmetric. Given that, I use the median instead
of the mean to represent the “average” value of the variables. I used total assets of the
bank divided by its equity capital, as well as non-performing loans divided by total
loans.
13  The first indicator measures the insolvency risk because the banks depend on
their financial capital to absorb default risks or portfolio losses that occur when a20
borrower is not able to repay a debt.  Additionally, the financial capital absorbs the losses
of the market risks associated with fluctuations in the market value of the bank’s assets
and liabilities.  The second indicator measures the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio.  A
bank can decide to increase its risk lending to the riskier borrower.  A bank that lends to
riskier borrower’s should have a higher ratio of bad loans to total loans than a bank that
follows more conservative credit policies.
I also included three indirect indicators of risk.  One indicator is the rate of growth
of total loans.  If a bank grows faster than the other banks, it will likely be more
aggressive in its lending policies, relaxing some parameters, or to have penetrated riskier
markets.  A second indicator is the liquidity ratio, which I define as the proportion of
deposits over cash plus bonds.  This is an indicator of risk because, if a bank is solvent
but faces an imbalance between short-term payments and short-term income, a run may
occur, and the bank will be forced to sell its assets at distress prices, threatening its
solvency. In fact, in the early warning system, called the Camel system, the liquidity ratio
is one of the three most important indicators; the other two are the asset to equity capital
ratio and the quality of the portfolio.
14
A third indicator is the volatility of the bank net interest income plus
commissions.  If a bank is more risky than the rest of the banks, this should be reflected
in a greater volatility of its net income.
I included two variables as proxies for the degree of rescue.  One variable is the
amount of subordinated debt that each bank owes to the Central Bank, as a proportion of
its equity capital.  The other variable measures the share of the Central Bank on the profit
of the banks, i.e., the percentage of each bank’s profit that the Central Bank receives.
                                                                                                                                                                            
13  In Chile, a loan is classified as non-performing after 90 days of delay in its payment.21
This is not a fixed quantity because, when a bank raises capital, the share of the Central
Bank is reduced.  Additionally, I used a dummy variable to identify the banks with
subordinated debt.
In relation to the efficiency indicators, there is some debate in the literature about
which concept of cost efficiency one should use. There are production and intermediation
(or asset) approaches.  The production approach focuses on operating expenses and
defines output as total loans plus bonds, cash, and deposits. The inputs are labor and
physical capital.  Thus, this approach includes deposits as an output for which high
operating costs are incurred.  Under the intermediation approach, total variable cost
includes the operating expenses plus interest and commissions paid, deposits being here
considered an input.  In any event, the difference is not important, empirically.
15
The translog cost function allow to works with different types output. I selected
two types of output. One is total loans plus deposits in the case of the production
approach or only total loans in the case of the intermediation approach. The other is cash
plus bonds.
One problem that I had to face is that the panel data was unbalanced because
some banks merged at some point during the course of the study.  In regard to the issue of
missing data, the literature about missing panel data distinguishes between ignorable and
non-ignorable cases.  Our case was non-ignorable because the events were not random,
given that the unbalance came from the merger of banks. Thus, I decided to eliminate the
                                                                                                                                                                            
14 See, Economic Review, 1983, which is a special issue on early warning systems.
15 Mester (1994) recognizes that the difference is not important  “..Luckily, the empirical results . . . on
scope efficiency do not seem to be very sensitive to which approach is taken.”22
banks about which I did not have complete information.  This left me with 29 banks.  I
am aware that this solution could create a selection bias.
16
Even though the cost function includes input prices, I was unable to include this
variable due to a lack of data.  I am aware that this could create a bias in the parameters
due to missing variables.  This bias can be considered absent, however, if relative prices
are constant during the period of study.  I tried to overcome this problem by estimating
the models over shorter periods of times, 1990-1995, because it is more plausible to
assume that the relative prices had been constant in a shorter period of time.
5.  Estimations and Results
In this section, I show the main results of my estimation in regard to the effects of
the mechanisms implemented to solve financial crisis on the management of the risk and
on efficiency of the bank.
5a.  Risk Level
The first results show that there is a high degree of dependence between the risk
level of a bank and its subordinated debt status.  Table 3 and 4 shows two contingency
tables which classify banks according to their level of risk (ratio of total assets to equity
capital or ratio of bad loans to total loans, respectively).  A bank is considered to have
high risk if its risk is above the median and low risk if it is below the median.  As can be
seen, a bank with subordinated debt has a probability of 0.8 of being a high risk bank,
                                                          
16 Baltagi (1995) explains the problem of missing data and its eventual solutions.23
while a bank without subordinated debt has a probability of only 0.4.  This difference is
statistically significant.  Additionally, the test of independence was rejected, confirming
that the variables are not independent.  Similar results were achieved with the indicators
of bad loans to total loans.
Also, the medians of the indicators of risk are higher for banks with subordinated
debt than for banks without subordinated debt.  In fact, the median of the ratio total assets
to equity capital for banks with subordinated debt is equal to 18, while for the banks
without subordinated debt, the median is only 10. These results are similar when the risk
indicator is the ratio of bad loans to total loans.  In this case, the banks with subordinated
debt had a median of 0.016, while the banks without subordinated debt had a median of
0.04%.
To obtain more information about moral hazard behavior, I analyzed some
indirect indicators of risk.  The advantages of these indirect indicators are that they
respond directly to the decision of the management and are normally correlated with the
risk of the banks.
The results summarized in Table 5,6 and 7 are mixed.  Both types of banks have
the same probability of having a high rate of growth of loans.  However, a bank with
subordinated debt has a higher probability of  iliquidity (0.7) than a bank without
subordinated debt (0.4). However, a bank with subordinated debt has less probability of
having high volatility of its net income than a bank without subordinated debt. Thus, the
results are not conclusive.
The relationship between the subordinated debt and the risk of the banks declined
over time. Table 8 and 9 shows how the probability of falling in the high risk category
changed over time, for banks with and without subordinated debt, during the period24
1986-1995. Ten years after the financial crisis, there was no longer connection between
risk level and subordinated debt status.
I then estimated the risk models, using cross-sectional and time series data, using
different procedures.  One problem that I had to face was that the initial conditions were
significantly different for each group and that some inertia is present in the process of
adjusting the risk level. Thus, our estimates could be biased. For example, a bank with
subordinated debt, as a result of the financial crisis, has significantly higher ratio of total
assets to equity capital and of bad loans to total loans as compared to the bank without
subordinated debt.  Then, if during the period of analysis the bank with subordinated debt
reduced its indicators of risk and its level of subordinated debt or the shares of the Central
Bank in the profits, there is a positive and significant relationship between the indicators
of risk and the subordinated debt.  However, this does not mean that the banks with
subordinated debt increased their risk due to moral hazard behavior.
To control for the inertia in the process, I estimated the models using a lag of the
dependent variable as an additional explanatory variable, as in equation 6.  I followed the
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) procedures, estimating the model in first differences, to
eliminate the individual specific effect, and used instrumental variables.  The results
indicate that the relationship between the level of risk and the subordinated debt is
positive and significant, when the indicator is the ratio of total assets to equity capital.
However, the relationship is not significant when the indicator is the ratio of bad loans to
total loans.  In Table 10 and 11, I show these results, with robust variance estimates.  As
can be seen, the results are similar for all three proxies variables for subordinated debt.
A graphical analysis confirms these results.  Figure 4 plots, for each bank with
subordinated debt, the ratio of total assets to equity capital and the average ratio for the25
banks without subordinated debt.  As can be seen, at the beginning of the period, there
was a reduction in the level of risk, but then it started to increase again, before the level
of risk of the bank with subordinated debt regressed to the average.  Figure 6 presents the
results when the indicator is the ratio of bad loans to total loans.  Here the results are
different; as the banks with subordinated debt significantly reduced their bad loan
portfolios over time. Thus, it is not completely clear that the banks with subordinated
debt were increasing or sustaining higher levels of risk.
For the next step, I analyzed the indirect indicators of risky behavior. In Table 12,
13 and 14, the results again show that there is no clear evidence that the banks with
subordinated debt were increasing or sustaining higher levels of risk.  The estimation of
the total loans growth model indicates that there is a negative and significant relationship
between total loans growth and whether a bank had subordinated debt.  This means that
the banks with subordinated grew less than banks without subordinated debt. Also, the
estimation of the liquidity ratio indicates that there is a significant negative relationship
between a bank’s liquidity ratio and its subordinated debt status.  Thus, banks with
subordinated debt had a lower probability of a liquidity problem. Additionally, no
significant relationship was found between the volatility of a bank’s net income and its
subordinated debt status.
Finally, I ran regressions to estimate the long-term relationship between our
indicators of risk and whether a bank had subordinated debt. These were cross-sectional
regressions using period averages of the variables, Table 15 and 16 confirms that the
difference in risk levels, when I used the direct indicators, is significant during the period
1986-1998.  Similar results are achieved from the period 1990-1995.26
To summarize, I can say that banks with subordinated debt had a significantly
higher level of risk than banks without subordinated debt during the period 1986-1998.
All the indicators and models of risk show that such banks to be riskier, and that this was
a long-term relationship.  However, it is not clear that these higher levels of risk were due
to moral hazard behavior.  First, the indirect indicators of risk do not show that banks
with subordinated were increasing their levels of risk.  Second, the banks with
subordinated debt had higher levels of risk at the beginning of the period as a result of the
financial crisis.  That could be the reason that a relationship was found between
subordinated debt and risk.  However, when I controlled for the initial conditions, the
relationship held steady.  This is the only evidence that supports the idea that the bank
with subordinated debt may have, to some extent, exhibited moral hazard behavior.
There are other ways in which one can understand that the banks with
subordinated debt had objectively higher levels of risk.  If these banks had a high level of
risk at the beginning of the period, they did not have to do anything to increase their risk
because it was already high.  This could be the reason why I did not find that the indirect
indicators revealed moral hazard behavior.  Additionally, this could be the reason why,
when I controlled for inertia, the model of the ratio of total assets to equity capital
showed that the subordinated debt positively and significantly affected the level of risk.
But, the graphs are consistent with the idea that the banks with subordinated debt did not
make a substantial effort in either directions, to reduce or to increase their level of risk.
However, the results of the model of the ratio of bad loans to total loans do not support
this hypothesis.  The explanation could be that banks with subordinated debt keep a
relatively high level of risk through the ratio of total assets to equity capital.  However,27
they do not seek to increase their risk through “looting behavior” such as lending money
to risky segments or relaxing their lending policies.
5b.  Efficiency
To estimate the effects of subordinated debt on the cost efficiency of the banks, I
first estimated a cost function for the Chilean banking industry for the period of 1986 to
1993. I used information only until 1993 because this permitted me to have just one
indicator of efficiency for all periods.  With this indicator, I compared the group of banks
with subordinated debt with the group of banks without subordinated debt.
The results of the estimation of the translog cost function are given in Table 17.
The production and the intermediation models show that the variables are significant and
the R
2 is high (0.97).  These results are the same under both procedures of estimation--the
fixed and random effects model.  In any case, I conducted tests  to select the more
appropriate model.  First, I tested for individual effects using the F-test for the fixed
effects models and the  Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests for the random
effects models.  The results of both tests called for the rejection of the hypothesis of
homogeneity, implying that the individual effects in equation 8 are different across bank.
The next concern was to distinguish whether the heterogeneity should be managed as a
fixed effect or as a random effect.  The results of the Hausman test indicated the rejection
of the hypothesis of independence; thus the fixed effects model is more appropriate.
After estimating the production cost and the intermediation models, I developed
indicators of efficiency with the individual specific effects, according to equation 9.  I
used both models, the cost production and the intermediation approach, and I used both
estimation procedures, fixed and random effects.  Thus, I had four indicators of cost28
efficiency for each bank.  In general, the correlation between the four indicators is very
high
17.  However our preferred model is the cost of production approach, because its
results are more robust to changes in estimation procedure.  As seen in Table 17, the
parameter does not change much, in this model, as we moves from fixed effects to
random effects estimations.
I found X-efficiency to be an average of 51%.  This level of efficiency is lower
than the level of efficiency founded for the US economy.  Mester (1994) reported that the
average for the US economy is between 70% and 80%.  Berger and  Mester (1997)
reviewed 130 studies on cost efficiency.  Their results confirmed those of Mester (1994)
for the US economy; they also presented the average of other countries, including the UK
with 55%, France with 95%, Denmark with 67%, and Norway with 90%.
Other results that can be used to validate the model are the economies of scale
estimated.  Equation 10 is the formula used to estimate the economies of scale from the
translog cost production function.  I estimated 0.7 to be the elasticity of real cost with
respect to output, evaluated at the mean output for the entire sample.  This value reveals
greater economies of scale than has been found for developed countries.  Mester (1994)
reports a relatively flat curve for the US economy, with a cost elasticity of around 0.95.
Lang and Wezel (1996) report moderate economies of scale for the German cooperative
banks.
(10)
                                                          
17 The correlation table is in appendix C.
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This assumes that each elements of the vector of output (y1 and y2) increases by the same
percentage.
I then estimated the relationship between the cost efficiency of the banks and
whether a bank had subordinated debt, using our four indicators of cost efficiency, as a
means to achieve more robust results.  Table 18 and 19 presents a classification of banks
according to their level of efficiency (cost of production model).  A bank is given a
“high” rating if its efficiency is above the median and a low rating if it is below the
median.  As can be seen, a bank with subordinated debt has a probability of .87 of having
a low rating, while a bank without subordinated debt has a probability of only .33.  This
difference is statistically significant.  Additionally, the test of independence was rejected,
confirming that the variables are not independent.  Similar results were achieved with the
cost of intermediation model.
I then ran a regression analysis between efficiency indicators from the cost of
production model and the subordinated debt indicators. The proxies of the subordinated
debt are the ratio of subordinated debt to equity capital and the share of the Central Bank
in the profits of the bank. Table 20 shows a negative and significant effect of
subordinated debt on efficiency, confirming the results presented in the contingency
tables.  The results are the same using each of the two proxies for subordinated debt.
18
The results indicate that if a bank increases its subordinate debt by an amount
equal to its capital, it will use about 6% more of resources, per unit of output than the
most efficiency bank.  Additionally, if the participation of the Central Bank in a bank’s
profits increases by 10 percentage points, that bank will be using 3% more resources than
                                                          
18 I included a dummy variable to control for the effect that a banks was controlled but a group of
shareholders on the operating cost. This variable was not statistically significant.30
the most efficient bank.  On average, the banks with subordinated debt use 20% more
resources, per unit of output, than the bank without subordinated debt.
I wondered whether there could be an alternative hypothesis for the agency
problem that could explain the lower efficiency of a bank with subordinated debt.  It is
possible that a financial crisis leads to a significant reduction in the scale of production of
the rescued banks, for example, a loss of deposits or clients.  In this case, the bank is less
efficient because it is too big for its number of clients or amount of assets and liabilities
and.  However, this type of inefficiency, which is measured by our indicators of
efficiency, is not due to agency problems.  It is the result of the crisis and the inertia in
adjusting the size of the banks.
To test this alternative hypothesis, I ran the cost production function and re-
calculated the indicators of efficiency during the period of 1990-1995.  Thus, even if
there were some inertia in adjusting the size of the banks, four years after the crisis is
sufficient time to make the adjustment.  However, the results remained the same.
In summary, the results indicate that the banks with subordinated debt were less
efficient than the other banks.  It is likely that the inefficiency is more related to agency
problems than to the initial conditions.
6.  Concluding Remarks
When the Central Bank purchases bad loans to handle bank failure, there is a
potential risk of moral hazard behavior on the part of the rescued bank.  There are two
channels through which the decisions of the bank might be affected.  First, the bank could
increase its level of risk and, second, the bank could become less cost efficient.31
The empirical evidence from the Chilean banking crisis of the 1980s indicates that
the banks with subordinated debt did have higher level of risk and were less cost
efficient.  However, it is not clear that the higher level of risk was due to moral hazard
behavior.
Despite the fact that expensive rescue packages were implemented, all the rescued
banks started with a significantly higher level of risk after the crisis.  This means that the
solutions implemented left an important group of banks operating with higher levels of
risk.  Thus, it is difficult to determine whether the higher risk of the bank with
subordinated debt is due to these initial conditions or to moral hazard behavior.
It is interesting to note, however, that only one of the rescued banks failed again.
This is a good result compared with the results of the rescue of the US Saving & Loans,
in which a significant number of institutions were sold or liquidated at the end of the
1980s.
One hypothesis is that the success of the mechanism implemented in Chile is due
to the fact that the authority took certain measures to reduce the moral hazard problem.
First, the banks with the greater financial problems, in which moral hazard problems
were potentially most serious, were closed.  Second, ceilings put by the authority on its
financial assistance also to limit moral hazard problems.  Third, during the time of the
crisis, in the banks with the greater financial problems, the management was changed and
a Provisional Administrator was assigned by the government.32
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Figure 4
Ratio of Total Assets to Equity Capital by Bank that have Subordinated Debt
(banks that have subordinated debt at least for four years)
year
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Note: Each graph represents a bank that have subordinated debt for at least eight years. The square symbols
is line of the ratio of total assets to equity capital of a bank and the triangle symbol is line of the average of
the ratio of total assets to equity capital of the banks that do not have subordinated debt.35
Figure 5
Ratio of Bad Loans to Total Loans by Bank that have Subordinated Debt
(banks that have subordinated debt at least for eight years)
year
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Note: Each graph represents a bank that have subordinated debt for at least eight years. The square symbols
is line of the ratio of bad loans to total loans of a bank and the triangle symbol is line of the average of the
ratio of bad loans to total loans of the banks that do not have subordinated debt.36
Table 1








Note: This table shows the number of financial institution that have subordinated debt each year and the
total number of financial institutions. Source: Superintendence of Banks.37
Table 2
Description of the Data, 1986-1998
(million of Ch$, 1986)
Description Median Value Range Percentil
(90%)
Equity Capital 4,521 663 - 83,628 18,830
Total Assets 43,682 2,369 - 1,292,064 382,208
Total Loans 25,330 778 - 900,679 217,736
Non-Performing
Loans
154 0 - 23,994 2,502




20,725 46 – 554,987 169,033
Operating
Expenses








5,489 .6 – 148,315 33,728
Shares of Central
Bank on Profits




2.6 0 – 8.4 6.1
Source: Superintendence of Banks.38
Table 3
Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of Risk:
ratio of total assets to equity capital
(Contingency Table)
Subordinated Debt












Pearson Chi2 (1) = 77,7 ***
Note: This table classifies banks according to their level of risk (ratio of total assets to equity
capital). A bank is considered to have high risk if its ratio of total assets to equity capital is above
the median and low risk if it is below the median.
*** significant at the 1% level.39
Table 4
Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of Risk:
ratio of bad loans to total loans
(Contingency Table)
Subordinated Debt












Pearson Chi2 (1) = 81***
Note: This table classifies banks according to their level of risk (ratio of bad loans to total loans).
A bank is considered to have high risk if its ratio of bad loans to total loansl is above the median
and low risk if it is below the median.
*** significant at the 1% level.40
Table 5
Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of Risk:
rate of loans growth
(Contingency Table)
Subordinated Debt












Pearson Chi2 (1) = 0.3
Note: This table classifies banks according to their level of risk (rate of loans growth). A bank is
considered to have high risk if its rate of loans growth is above the median and low risk if it is
below the median.
*** significant at the 1% level.41
Table 6
















Pearson Chi2 (1) = 23***
Note: This table classifies banks according to their level of risk (ratio of liquidity). A bank is
considered to have high risk if its ratio of liquidity is above the median and low risk if it is below
the median.
*** significant at the 1% level.42
Table 7
Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of Risk:
volatility of the net income
(Contingency Table)
Subordinated Debt












Pearson Chi2 (1) = 5.2**
Note: Volatility on net income is equal to the variance of the net income during the period 1986-
1993. The table classifies banks according to their level of risk (volatility of the bank net income).
A bank is considered to have high risk if its volatility of the net income is above the median and
low risk if it is below the median.
** significant at the 1% level.43
Table 8
Bank’s Probability of Being High Risk
(Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of Risk)
total assets to equity
capital








Yes No Yes No
1986-1998 84% 38% 78*** 85% 38%   81***
1987-1998 85% 39% 67*** 85% 40% 63***
1988-1998 85% 40% 51*** 83% 41% 47***
1989-1998 84% 42% 38*** 83% 43% 34***
1990-1998 80% 44% 25*** 80% 44% 24***
1991-1998 76% 45% 14*** 80% 45% 19***
1992-1998 77% 45% 12*** 74% 47% 9***
1993-1998 76% 46% 8*** 64% 49% 2
1994-1998 71% 48% 3* 65% 50% 1.4
1995-1998 60% 50% .4 60% 50% .3
Note: (1) Pearson test of independence.
The table shows the probability that a bank with and without subordinated debt is classify as a
high risk bank. Appendix A show the probability by year.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.
*     significant at the 10% level.44
Table 9
Bank’s Probability of Being High Risk
(Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of Risk)
total loans growth liquidity ratio




Yes No Yes No
1986-1998 57% 55% .3 69% 43% 23***
1987-1998 50% 52% .2 75% 42% 33***
1988-1998 50% 52% .08 83% 41% 47***
1989-1998 48% 52% .3 88% 41% 50***
1990-1998 50% 52% .04 89% 41% 42***
1991-1998 49% 51% .09 89% 42% 32***
1992-1998 49% 52% .12 86% 44% 21***
1993-1998 56% 51% .25 84% 45% 13***
1994-1998 53% 51% .02 82% 46% 8***
1995-1998 50% 51% .0 80% 48% 3.8**
Note: (1) Pearson test of independence.
The table shows the probability that a bank with and without subordinated debt is classify as a
high risk bank. Appendix B show the probability by year.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.
*     significant at the 10% level45
Table 10
Effects of  the Subordinated Debt on the Risk Level of the
Banks, Dependent Variable: total assets to equity capital
(1986-1998)




















2 0.04 0.03 0.0546
Table 11
Effects of  the Subordinated Debt on the Risk Level of the
Banks, Dependent Variable: bad loans to total loans




















2 0.01 0.01 0.1
Note: Each column reports the regression coefficients with robust variance
estimate. The standard deviation is in parenthesis.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.47
Table 12
Effects of  the Subordinated Debt on the Risk Level of the
Banks, Dependent Variable: total growth of the banks




















2 0.01 0.01 0.0148
Table 13
Effects of  the Subordinated Debt on the Risk Level of the
Banks, Dependent Variable: liquidity ratio




















2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Note: Each column reports the regression coefficients with robust variance
estimate. The standard deviation is in parenthesis.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.49
Table 14
Effect of  the Subordinated Debt on the Risk Level of the
Banks, Dependent Variable: volatility of net income
(1986-1993)


















2 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: The volatility of the net income is the variance in the period 1986-1993. Each
column reports the regression coefficients with robust variance estimate. The standard
deviation is in parenthesis.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.50
Table 15
Effects of  the Subordinated Debt on the Bank Risk, Long-Term
Relationship Dependent Variable: total assets to equity capital
(between estimator, 1986-1998)


















2 0.3 0.2 0.451
Table 16
Effects of  the Subordinated Debt on the Bank Risk, Long-Term
Relationship Dependent Variable: bad loans to total loans


















2 0.4 0.3 0.4
Note: Each column reports the regression coefficients with robust
variance estimate. The between estimator is  a regression  of   the
average of the dependent and independent variables for the period.
The standard deviation is in parenthesis.
*** significant at the 1% level.




Cost of production model Cost of intermediation model






























































R2 .97 .91 .97 .92







Note: Each column reports the regression coefficients with robust variance estimate. The standard
deviation is in parenthesis.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.53
Table 18
Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of  Efficiency, Indicator
of Efficiency: cost of production model
(Contingency Table)
Subordinated Debt















Pearson Chi2 (1) = 6.8 ***
Note: This table classifies banks according to their level of efficiency (indicator of efficiency
from the cost of production model). A bank is considered to be high efficient if its indicator of
efficiency is above the median and low risk if it is below the median.
*** significant at the 1% level.54
Table 19
Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of  Efficiency, Indicator
of Efficiency: cost of production model
(Contingency Table)
Subordinated Debt












Pearson Chi2 (1) = 9.7 ***
Note: This table classifies banks according to their level of efficiency (indicator of efficiency
from the cost of intermediation model). A bank is considered to be high efficient if its indicator of
efficiency is above the median and low risk if it is below the median.
*** significant at the 1% level.55
Table 20
Effects of  Subordinated Debt on the Efficiency of the Banks:
Dependent Variable: efficiency level
(average, 1986-1993)















Note:   Each  column reports  the  regression coefficients  with
robust variance estimate. The standard deviation is in parenthesis.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.56
Appendix A
Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of Risk:
bank’s probability of being high risk
total assets to equity capital bad loans to total loans




Yes No Yes No
1986 74% 30% 7.4*** 84% 20% 16***
1987 89% 15% 22*** 84% 20% 16***
1988 94% 19% 20*** 88% 24% 15***
1989 100% 27% 18*** 92% 31% 12***
1990 100% 32% 15*** 100% 32% 15***
1991 100% 34% 13*** 100% 34% 13***
1992 90% 34% 8*** 100% 33% 13***
1993 88% 41% 5.4** 75% 44% 2.3
1994 86% 42% 4.2* 57% 50% .11
1995 60% 48% .2 80% 48% 1.7
Note: (1) Pearson test of independence.
The table shows the probability that a bank with and without subordinated debt is classify as a
high risk bank.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.
*     significant at the 10% level.57
Appendix B
Cross Classification of Types of Banks by Level of Risk:
bank’s probability of being high risk
total loans growth liquidity ratio
Subordinated
Debt




Yes No Yes No
1986 53% 50% .02
1987 58% 45% .7 63% 40% 2.1
1988 56% 48% .3 81% 29% 10***
1989 17% 69% 9.1 83% 35% 8***
1990 46% 57% .4 91% 36% 10***
1991 50% 52% .01 90% 38% 8***
1992 20% 63% 5.4** 90% 37% 8.2***
1993 13% 63% 6.3** 88% 41% 5.4**
1994 43% 54% .3 86% 42% 4.2**
1995 60% 52% .11 80% 44% 2.1
Note: (1) Pearson test of independence.
The table shows the probability that a bank with and without subordinated debt is classify as a
high risk bank.
*** significant at the 1% level.
**   significant at the 5% level.
*     significant at the 10% level58
Appendix C
Correlation of the Indicator of Cost Efficiency








     fixed effects 1
     random effects 0.97 1
Cost of intermediation
     fixed effects 0.77 0.63 1
     random effects 0.57 0.57 0.70 1Documentos de Trabajo
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